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ARTICLE 235 OF THE TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: POTENTIAL
CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE
DYNAMICS OF LAWMAKING IN THE
COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
Franziska Tschofen *
INTRODUCTION

Since the launching of the ambitious Single Market Program, the
European Community's progress towards integration has exceeded all
expectations. Former periods of "Eurosclerosis" have given way to
widespread feelings of "Europhoria." Though undisputably positive
and welcome, this development has entailed a host of new problems.
One of the most pressing problems facing the European Community
today is that its institutions, initially conceived by the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community' to govern a purely economic association with limited powers, no longer seem adequate for a
Community striving for political union.
The gradual completion of the Single European Market goes handin-hand with a substantial increase in Community powers, necessitating the reform of Community institutions. This need for institutional
reform was recognized at the Summit Meeting of the Heads of State
and Government of the European Community in Dublin in June 1990,
and is presently under consideration in an intergovernmental conference formally initiated on December 15, 1990, in Rome. Such reform
will have to focus on two critical aspects: first, the institutions will
have to become more efficient; second, they will have to provide protection for constitutional rights and supply the emerging European
political system with appropriate democratic legitimacy. 2 "Europolit* Mag. jur. (University of Vienna); Dr. jur. (University of Vienna); LL.M. (Harvard Law
School); Assistant to the Vice President and General Counsel, the World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in I TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
207-609 (1987) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2. Because it is in its initial stage, no concrete reform proposals have yet been advanced
within the intergovernmental conference aimed at creating a political, economic and monetary
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ics" (even more so than "Euroeconomics") needs legitimacy, transparency, foreseeability and respect for the principle of subsidiarity 3 as
a condicio sine qua non for the creation of a stable, effective and equitable economic and quasi-political system.
At present this system draws its legitimacy from successful political and economic achievements rather than from stringent, transpar-

ent democratic procedures. The Community's unpredictable forays
into areas traditionally regarded as the exclusive domain of national
legislatures, 4 without the participation of either a democraticallyelected Community organ or the national parliaments, is a particularly
problematic aspect of the present lack of a "constitutional backbone"
for Community action. Gradually, Member States, national tribunals,5 national parliaments 6 and federal entities 7 are becoming more
union. The negotiations are based on a summit document prepared by the European Council
which addresses both of the critical aspects of institutional reform mentioned here. European
Council, Rome, 14 and 15 December 1990, Presidency Conclusions (Part 1), Agence Europe, No.
5393, at 5 (Dec. 16, 1990). The conference has been asked by the Council to give particular
attention to the following: "Democratic legitimacy - In order to strengthen the role of the
European Parliament; ...extension and improvement of the co-operation procedure [established
by the SEA];... assent to international agreements;... involvement of the European Parliament
in the appointment of the Commission and its President; increased powers on budget control and
financial accountability; consolidation of the rights of petition and enquiry; ... develop[ment of]
co-decision procedures for acts of a legislative nature; ... arrangements allowing national Parliaments to play their full role in the Community's development; ... the adoption of arrangements
that take account of the special competence of regional or local institutions;... the consultation
of such institutions; ... the importance of the principle of subsidiarity;" and the "effectiveness
and efficiency of the Union's institutions." Id. at 5-6, 8.
3. Article 12, paragraph 2 of the draft Treaty on European Union defines the subsidiarity
principle as follows:
Where this Treaty confers concurrent competence on the Union, the Member States shall
continue to act as long as the Union has not legislated. The Union shall only act to carry
out those tasks which may be undertaken more effectively in common than by the Member
States acting separately, in particular those whose execution requires action by the Union
because their dimension or effects extend beyond national frontiers.
Editorial Comments.- The Subsidiarity Principle, 27 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 181 (1990).
4. This development particularly concerns the "borderline" areas of Community competence, such as health services, consumer protection, social security, culture, research and technology, monetary policy and education.
5. The relationship between national tribunals and the Court of Justice of the European
Communities [hereinafter the Court] regarding the Court's extensive interpretation of Community law is marked by growing tensions. See La Cour de Justice des Communautds Europdennes
et les Etats Membres, ASSOCIATION BtLGE POUR LE DROIT EUROPKEN (Jan. 25, 1990).
6. National parliaments have criticized the Commission for its unselective and overly extensive policy of harmonization under article 100. See, e.g., the report published by the British
House of Lords in 1978, which criticized the growth of Community law on environmental issues.
Twenty-second Report of the Select Committee on the European Communities on the Approximation of Laws, [1977-1978] House of Lords, 131, 199 (July 4, 1978).
7. Federal entities, most importantly the federal states (Lander) of the Federal Republic of
Germany, also view the Community's expanding authority with growing concern. A drastic
example of extension of Community powers to areas traditionally within the domain of Lander
competences was the request by the European Parliament for a Commission directive to implement the right of citizens in Member States of the Community to participate in municipal elections in other Member States. Wahlrecht fir EC-Biirger bei Kommunalwahlen, European
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apprehensive of this development and have begun to question its com8
patibility with their national constitutions.
Article 235 of the Treaty has been an important factor in this development insofar as it provides for the exercise of certain powers beyond those expressly mentioned in the Treaty. This provision reads as
follows:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the

course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of
the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers,
the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate
9
measures.

Article 235, an "open" provision, is designed to supply the Community with the powers necessary to meet its objectives under changing realities. It has increasingly been regarded as an efficient
instrument for solidifying the creation of the Common Market without amending the Treaty.
The purpose of this essay is to analyze the extent to which the
present interpretation and application of article 235 of the Treaty appears to be incompatible with basic national constitutional safeguards
such as the principles of democracy, the "Rule of Law," sovereignty
and federalism and to discuss ways to reconcile potential incompatibilities. To this end, Part I will explore the scope of the authority of
EEC organs under article 235 as delimited by the European Court of
Justice and legal scholars. Part II will analyze potential conflicts between Community powers exercised pursuant to article 235 of the
Treaty and national constitutional guarantees. The essay will conclude by proposing safeguards and suggesting remedies against such
possible violations of constitutional principles.

Parliament Decision of December 15, 1987, 15 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIvr
[EuGRZ] 89 (1988).
8. The Danish government is particularly critical of the extensive use of article 235. For an
overview of the discussion of this problem during the Danish accession negotiations, see Lachmann, Some Danish Reflections on the Use of Article 235 of the Rome Treaty, 18 COMMON MKT.
L. REv. 447 (1981).
9. See the similar provision in article 95 of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community ("ECSC"). Compare this to the "necessary and proper clause" of the U.S.
Constitution, which empowers Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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ORGANS

The Application of Article 235

The founders of the European Communities Io intended the Treaty
to be a mere framework of rules: a traiti cadre, not overly detailed,
and flexible enough to support a continuously evolving, dynamic process of integration which would eventually culminate in a Single European Market. They recognized that it was impossible to provide for all
contingencies and that consequently the projected means of the EEC
organs to achieve the objectives of the Treaty would, in the process of
integration, eventually prove insufficient.II The framers of the Treaty
were aware of both the critical importance of article 235 and the controversy it was likely to cause once the integration process gained
momentum.
1. The Growing Importance of the Provision Since 1972
Prior to 1973, Community legislation only relied on article 235 as
a legal basis for provisions regarding trade in processed agricultural
products and uniform customs legislation. 12 But following the political decision made in 1972 in Paris by the Heads of State and Government of the EEC Member States to apply article 235 more broadly,13
there has been a remarkable increase in regulatory measures based on
this article.14 As a result of this shift in policy, decisions and regulations regarding free movement of workers, free exercise of a trade or
profession, energy, scientific research, social policy and regional policy
were increasingly enacted on the basis of article 235.15 These were
followed by measures concerning the social security of self-employed
persons, environmental protection, coordination of national monetary
10. The European Communities [hereinafter EC] comprise the European Coal and Steel
Community, established by the Treaty of Paris on April 18, 195 1, the European Economic Community [hereinafter EEC or Community] and the European Atomic Energy Community
("Euratom"), both established by the Treaties of Rome on March 25, 1957. See EEC Treaty,
supra note 1. The following analysis is limited to the European Economic Community.
II. See Walter Hallstein's statement about the motive for including article 235 in the Treaty
in W. HALLSTEIN, DIE EUROPAISCHE GEMEINSCHAFT 319 (1st ed. 1973). Hallstein made a

substantial contribution to the framing of the EEC Treaty and was the first president of the
European Commission.
12. H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, 6 THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY 316 (1990).

13. It was agreed upon "to use as widely as possible all the provisions of the Treaties including Article 235 of the EEC Treaty." See Solemn Declarationof the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Enlarged Community, 10 BULL. EC, Supp. 10/72, at 23 (1972).
14. Between 1962 and 1972, 13 directives, regulations or decisions were based on article 235;
between 1973 and 1982, this number increased to 206, and between 1983 and mid-1990, to 209.
15. H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 12, at 302-08.
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7
policies 16 and, increasingly, projects in various fields of research.'
Not surprisingly, acts relating to the "accompanying policies" of
the Community - i.e., those actions not related to the core "four free-

doms" (goods, persons, services and capital) but which are essential
for the achievement of the "freedoms" - have accounted for most of
the measures issued under article 235. The most important are regulations relating to monetary policy' and environmental protection.' 9
Article 235 is also expected to be of increasing importance in connection with the conclusion of numerous trade accords with Eastern Eu-

ropean countries in response to their growing ties with Western
economies. Previous treaty mechanisms would have been insufficient
for this task. For instance, article 113 of the Treaty, which provides
for the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements with third countries,
is limited to trade matters and would not encompass the regulation of
financial and technical assistance. Finally, article 235 has served as
the basis for establishing several legal entities within the Community

itself.20 For many of the projects mentioned above, the Treaty provides little other support for Community action. 2'
The increasing use of article 235 powers since 1972 has been facilitated and enhanced by the political willingness, as espressed in the
Solemn Declaration of 1972, to further the development of the integration process. The key to this development, however, lies in the nature
of the integration process itself. The growing conjunction of the Member States' economies and legal systems calls for further expansion of

Community activities. 22 Integration has thus gained its own dynam-

16. Article 235 was used as a legal basis for part of the measures necessary to establish the
European Monetary System ("EMS") in March 1979, and especially for the creation of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund in 1973 (through Council Regulation 907/73, 16 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 89) 2 (1973)). See Seidel, Das Europdische Wahrungssystem: Rechtliche Grundlage und Ausgestaltung, 14 EUROPARECHT [EuR] 13 (1979).
17. Eg., EUREKA (information science and telecommunications), ERASMUS (exchange of
workers and students) and COMETT (cooperation between universities and students).
18. See generally Lauwaars, Art. 235 als Grundlage fiir die flankierenden Politiken im
Rahmen der Wirtschafts -und Wahrungsunion, 11 EuR 100 (1976).
19. See infra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., European Center for the Development of Vocational Training, 18 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 39) 1 (1975); European Foundationfor the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 139) 1 (1975); European Economic Interest Grouping, 28
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 1 (1985); European Regional Development Fund, 18 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 73) 1 (1975).
21. The particular problem connected with the creation of institutions (see supra note 20) is
that any endowment of a new entity with legislative competences of its own would exceed the
power conferred on the Community organs by article 235. See Everling, Die Allgemeine Ermd'chtigung der Europiischen Gemeinschaft zur Zielverwirklichung nach Art. 235 EWG- Vertrag, 1
EuR 16 (1976).
22. G. NICOLAYSEN, EUROPAISCHEs GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT 47 (1979); but see D. DORN,
ART. 235 EWGV - PRINZIPIEN DER AUSLEGUNG 13 (1986).
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ics. The increasing use of article 235 is linked to this process and is
therefore likely to continue regardless of changing political constellations. With the remarkable acceleration of the pace of integration and Community legislation - following the Single European Act, in-

creasing use of article 235 may create serious concerns as to its constitutional legitimacy.
2. A Typical Example of the Application of Article 235:
Environmental Protection
The importance of environmental issues for a transborder economic enterprise like the Community became obvious soon after the

entry into force of the Treaty. In addition to the growing awareness of
environmental problems and the need for concerted efforts toward
their solution, the Community, as a customs union striving for the
elimination of all trade barriers, was faced with the problem that the
environmental protection measures taken individually by the Member
States had effectively created non-tariff trade barriers, thus hindering
the free movement of goods within the internal market. The need for
a common environmental policy was officially proclaimed in the Final
Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Member
States of the Enlarged Community, 23 and the Community organs were
urged to elaborate an environmental plan of action as well as a detailed time schedule for its implementation. 24
Once this new commitment of the Commission had been decided

upon politically, the problem arose that no legal basis for environmentA policy existed in the Treaty. Therefore, such a basis had to be "in-

vented."' 25 In order to create a Community competence in the field of
environmental protection, an expansive interpretation of the objectives
of the Treaty as enumerated in article 2 was attempted. 26 It was ar23. The First Summit Conference of the Enlarged Community, 5 BULL. EC No. 10, at 14, 20
(1972).
24. Council Declaration of November 22, 1973, on the Programme of Action of the European
Communities on the Environment, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1 (1973). The program has
periodically been updated, most recently by the Council Resolution on the Continuation and Implementation ofa European Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment (19871992), 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 328) 1 (1987).
25. Scheuing, Umweltschutz aufder Grundlage der Einheitlichen Europdischen Akte, 24 EuR
152, 158 n. 37 (1989), speaks of the "discovered" legal basis for environmental policy. Extremely
critical of the asserted Community competence regarding environmental policy before the passing of the SEA are Grabitz & Sasse, Umweltschutz der Europdischen Gemeinschaften: Vorschlag
zur Ergdnzung des EWG-Vertrages, A59 BEITRAGE ZUR UMWELTGESTALTUNG (1977).

26. See Council Declaration of November 22, 1973 relating to the first action scheme of the
Economic Communities for the Environmental Protection, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1
(1973). See also Procureur de laRipublique v. Association de Dfense des Brileurs d'Huiles
Usages, 1985 E.C.R. 538, 549.
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gued, for instance, that the effort to improve living and working conditions in the Member States (preamble, clause 3) and the harmonious
development of economic activities (article 2) were possible only in a
safe and protected environment. Another equally questionable way to
"legalize" Community regulation of environmental issues was the
Commission's use of article 100 of the Treaty, the provision for harmonizing Member States' laws having an immediate effect on the crea27
tion of the Common Market.
Not surprisingly, the potential of article 235 for providing a legal

foundation for environmental regulation did not escape the attention
of the ingenious engineers of European environmental policy. Indeed,
most directives either were based jointly on articles 100 and 235,28 or
issued solely on the basis of article 235.29 However, it was generally
believed that "articles 100 and 235 of the EEC Treaty in conjunction
with the preamble and article 2 of the EEC Treaty do not provide a
secure legal basis for the development of environmental policy . ..
within the framework of the Treaty." '30 For example, the legality of
the Council's directive on the conservation of wild bird species 3 1 has
been challenged repeatedly on the ground that it clearly exceeded the

scope of article

235.32

33
Prior to the entry into force of the Single European Act ("SEA")

in 1987, more than 200 acts relating to environmental protection issued on the basis of articles 100 and 235 laid the foundation for the
formation of a very specific Community environmental policy. 34 The
adoption of the SEA, the first substantial amendment to the Treaty of
27. See Scheuing, supra note 25, at 155 (citing Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E.C.R.
1099); Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E.C.R. 1115.
28. E.g., Council Directive on the Disposal of Waste Oils, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194) 23
(1975).
29. E.g., Council Directive on the Conservation of Wild Birds, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
103) 1 (1979); CouncilDecision on the Conclusion of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) 10 (1982); Council Decision, 25
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 38) 1 (1982) (concerning the conclusion of the Convention on the
Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats).
30. Rehbinder & Stewart, Legal Integration in Federal Systems: European Community EnvironmentalLaw, 33 AM. J.CoMP. L. 371, 400 (1985).
31. Id.
32. Nicolaysen, Environmental Policy Before the Single European Act, in STRUCTURE AND
DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POLICY 112-15 (J.Schwarze & H. Schermers eds.
1988); Kaiser, Grenzen der EG-Zustandigkeit, 15 EuR 116 n. 69 (1980); Scheuing, supra note 25,
at 156. Scheuing remarks that, surprisingly, the invalidity of the directive due to the lack of legal
basis for its passing has never been mentioned by the Member States, although there have been
proceedings - and judgments - against five of them for failing to implement this directive into
national law.
33. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 506 (1986).
34. See Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag (Verlag C.H. Beck) Art. 130s, at 45-264 (loose-leaf
ed. 1984). See also Council Regulation on the Establishment of the European Environment
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Rome, provided an occasion for finally supplying a sound legal foundation to the already considerable corpus of law on environmental
protection which had evolved on the shaky basis of political consensus
alone.3 5 From a legal perspective, however, such a retroactive legitimation of a fait accompli can only be regarded as a cosmetic concealment of a legal facade.
Since the entry into force of the SEA, resort to article 235 for the
implementation of Community measures has become unnecessary in
several fields.3 6 This does not, however, diminish the provision's importance, or the inherent risk in invoking it. Other, not yet envisaged,
areas could very well be "conquered" by the Community through extensive application of article 235, as occurred in the area of environmental protection. Furthermore, since it has added to the existing
objectives of the Community, the adoption of the SEA may even in37
crease the scope of application of article 235.
B. Interpretation of Article 235
Article 235 has been labeled a provision on the border between law
and politics. 38 Practice has shown that it offered legal justification to
whatever was politically opportune. Its inherently political nature
makes it difficult to explore the provision satisfactorily through legal
means alone. One should nevertheless attempt to establish its concrete
legal meaning and limitations in order to supply a legitimate legal
framework for political decisions.3 9 The Community itself has recently acknowledged legal limits to its power to take legislative measures according to article 235: within the new provision regarding the
Economic and Monetary Union created by the SEA, it is expressly
Agency and the European Environment Information and Observation Network, 33 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L. 120) 1 (1990).

35. See EEC Treaty arts. 130R-130T; see also Vandermeersch, The Single European Act and
the Environmental Policy of the European Economic Community, 12 EUR. L. REV. 407 (1987).
36. These areas include: working conditions (EEC Treaty art. 118A); regional policy (arts.
130A-130E); the environment (arts. 130R-130T); and the fields now covered by SEA art. 20 (the
European Monetary Cooperation Fund was formerly adopted by a Council regulation, 21 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 379) 2 (1978), and was based on art. 235) and SEA art. 23 (the European
Regional Development Fund was also created by a Council regulation, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 73) 1 (1975) and was also based on art. 235).
37. Tizzano, Quelques Remarques Gdndrales sur L'Elargissement des Compdtences Communautaires, in STRUCTURE AND DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POLICY 47 (1988).
38. See von Meibom, Book Review, 7 EuR 289 (1972) (reviewing H. GERICKE, ALLGEMEINE
RECHTSETZUNGSBEFUGNISSE NACH ARTIKEL

235

EWG-VERTRAG):

"Eine Vorschrift auf der

Grenze zwischen Recht und Politik, zwischen gesetztem Ordnungssystem und funktioneller
Entwicklung."
39. The only "framework" of concern to the decision-makers in Brussels seems to be the
political powerplay. Once unanimity is reached and thus political legitimation provided, legal
questions become of secondary importance, if not disregarded altogether.
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stated that the formal amendment provision of the Treaty, article
236, 40 is applicable to any further development involving institutional
41
changes in this area.
1. The Views of Academic Commentators
Commentators' views regarding the scope of application of article
235 of the Treaty differ widely. The various interpretations of the provision are strongly influenced by the authors' positive or negative attitudes towards the progressive integration of the Community itself.
Thus, some authors view article 235 as a mere "gap-filling provision,"
limited strictly to supplementing existing competences by single powers not provided in the Treaty, 42 while others consider article 235 to be
a key provision conferring a wide-ranging "competence to create competences" 43 on the Community."
According to those authors who advocate a limited application of
article 235, a matter which does not already pertain to the Community's authority or which is not at least implied by an express power
cannot be regulated by means of "appropriate measures" within the
meaning of article 235. Advocates of the alternative view, however,
regard article 235 as conferring a singular and independent power
which secures the functioning of the Common Market, 45 and which
46
represents a flexible tool for integration in its dynamic development.
It seems at least questionable whether this interpretation finds support
in the provision's wording. Commentators supporting an expansive
40. Article 236 reads: "The Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of this Treaty. If the Council, after consulting
the European Parliament and, where appropriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in favour
of calling a conference of representatives of the Governments of the Member States, the conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to be made to this Treaty. The amendments shall enter into force
after being ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements." EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 236.
41. Id. at art. 100A, para. 2.
42. R. LAUWAARS, LAWFULNESS AND LEGAL FORCE OF COMMUNITY DECISIONS 82
(1973); Riegel, Uberlegangen zon Problem EG-Richtlinien und Nationale Rahmentionpetenz, 12
EuR 80 (1977). See also Tomuschat, Die Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse der EWG in Generalermdchtigungen, Insbesondere in Art. 235 EWGV, 11 EuR 64 (1976).
43. See Zuleeg, Der Verfassungsgrundsatz der Demokratie und die Europdischen Gemeinschaften, 17 DER STAAT 27, 42 (1978); Ophiils, Die Mehrheitsbeschlu'sse der Rate in den
Europdischen Gemeinschaflen, 1 EuR 216 (1966). But see Everling, supra note 21, at 14.
44. This broad interpretation of the provision is mainly - but not altogether satisfactorily justified by the decision in Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson GmbH, 1973 E.C.R.
897. See Meier, Anmerkung zu EuGH 12. 7.1973, RS 8/73, AUSSENWIRTSCHAFISDIENST DES
BETRIEBSBERATERS [AWD] 41, 42 (1974).
45. Meier, Die Mitwirkung der Bundesregierungbei der Gesetzgebung des Rates der Europais.
chen Gemeinschaften, 24 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 961, 962 (1971).
46. See G. NICOLAYSEN, supra note 22, at 45.
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interpretation of article 235 concede only that a new policy for which
an economic link can no longer be established may not be the object of
a measure under article 235. 47 This "restriction," however, is clearly
too elastic. The purchase of military equipment - part of national
defense, a power almost exclusively reserved to the State - may serve
as an example. Trade in military goods, even from a strictly economic
viewpoint, can arguably be seen as part of the operation of the Common Market because it may affect the "free flow of goods," '48 and thus
would be sufficient to provide the necessary economic nexus.
a. Analysis of the Individual Elements of Article 235
i.

"Necessary to attain"

The first prerequisite for the application of article 235 is that action
taken by the Council must be necessary to attain the objectives of the
Community. This requirement is met whenever two questions can be
answered in the affirmative: (1) Has one of the objectives of the Treaty
not been fully or satisfactorily attained?49 (2) Can Community institutions rectify the situation by exercising power?50 In other words, action is judged necessary whenever the actual pace of integration - i.e.,
the degree of realization of the Treaty's goals - falls short of the
objectives set out in the Treaty.
Commentators agree that this condition may almost always be fulfilled, 5 1 thus offering Community organs nearly unlimited or at least
substantial leeway. 52 However, this interpretation appears to be problematic for several reasons. First, it can hardly be assumed that the
Contracting Parties of the Treaty consented to conferring such a broad
47. Behrens, Die Umweltpolitik der Europdischen Gemeinschaften und Art. 235 EWGV, in
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATr [DVBL]

462, 466 (1978).

48. Sasse & Yourow, The Growth of Legislative Power of the European Communities, in I
COURTS AND FREE MARKETS 96 (1982). This is an extreme example, which suggests that the
"Community's competence is ultimately what the Council of Ministers chooses to make it."
Usher, The Gradual Widening of EC Policy in Particularon the Basis of Articles 100 and 235
EEC Treaty, in STRUCTURE AND DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POLICY 36 (1988).
It should be noted, however, that even authors who support an extensive interpretation of article
235 doubt whether some Community activities still could be seen as within the provision's scope.
J.Usher, id., mentions in this regard two Community acts relating to South Africa: the regulation suspending imports of gold coins from South Africa (29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 305) 11
(1986)) and the Council's decision to suspend new direct investments (29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (NO.
L 305) 45 (1986)).
49. H. GERICKE, ALLGEMEINE RECHTSSETZUNGSBEFUGNISSE NACH ARTIKEL 235 EWGVERTRAG 108 (1970).
50. Ehring, Art. 235, in 2 KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG 748-96 (1974).
51. Schwartz, Art. 235 H. Ann. 170, in 3 KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG 1217-18
(1983).
52. L. CONSTANTINESCO, I DAS RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 273 (1977);
H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 12, at 328.
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discretion on the Community organs. National legislatures, aware of
the delicate problem of transfer of sovereignty, were not prepared to
concede more powers than necessary to the new supranational institution.5 3 Second, the question whether Community action is necessary
ought to be regarded as justiciable and therefore subject to review by
the European Court of Justice. What is "necessary" should thus be
determined by judgment of the Court. Although some authors have
expressed the opinion that this decision is of a merely political nature
and thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, 4 the more convincing view appears to be that this question involves the interpretation of the Treaty and also of secondary Community law, making the
decision whether action by the Community is necessarily a matter of
law subject to the Court's supervision.5
ii.

"One of the objectives of the community"

Commentators unanimously hold that the objectives of the Community include the general goals listed in articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty
and the special goals named in various provisions dealing with individual subject matters. 56 It is disputed, however, whether the goals mentioned in the preamble ought to be included. While some authors
maintain that those goals can at best merely offer a guide to the interpretation of the Treaty,5 7 those favoring a more extensive interpretation believe that the preamble should be viewed as containing
"objectives of the Community,""8 thus representing an additional basis
for Community action under article 235 if the other conditions are
met.5 9
Scholars are unanimous, however, in holding that the Treaty, regardless of whether the ideas set out in the preamble are included,
enumerates the objectives of the Community in an exclusive manner.
This means that article 235 may not be used to create any new
objectives. 6°
53. For an essentially similar discussion, see von Meibom, Lu'ckenfillung bei den Eurmpdischen Gemeinschaftsvertrdgen, 21 NJW 2165 (1968).
54. H. GERICKE, supra note 49, at 52.
55. See B. BEUTLER, R. BIEBER, J. PIPKORN & J. STREIL, DIE EUROPAISCHE GEMEINSCHAFT 66 (1987) [hereinafter B. BEUTLER].
56. R. LAUWAARS, supra note 42, at 85.
57. Id.
58. Schwartz, Art. 235 Ann. 116, in 3 KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG 1200 (1983).
59. Behrens, supra note 47, at 465.
60. D. DORN, supra note 22, at 24 (and sources cited therein). This does not, of course,
preclude an extensive or even teleological interpretation of existing Community objectives, as
shown by the example of environmental protection.
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"In the course of the operation of the common market"

A third prerequisite for the application of article 235 is that community action must prove necessary "in the course of the operation of
the common market." The German text uses the term Rahmen6t
("frame"), which suggests inherent limitations on the Community's
actions. Some authors deduce from this that this element of article
235 represents the most important "brake-mechanism" on the powers
62
conferred by the provision.
The French, 63 Italian6 4 and English versions, it should be noted,
differ from the German and Dutch 65 as to this aspect of article 235.
Conclusions based on the use of a specific term in one of several different text versions are problematic, especially in the light of the Court's
observation regarding divergences between different versions of multilingual texts. 66 It therefore seems safer and more accurate to regard
the provision as inclusive of all those decisions which serve the smooth
realization of the "four freedoms, '67 as long as they are closely connected with existing powers. 68
iv.

"This Treaty has not provided the necessary powers"

In order for article 235 to be applicable, the Treaty must not have
provided elsewhere the powers necessary to attain one of its goals.
This element of the provision makes it clear that recourse to article
235 may only be taken subsidiarily.
In order to prove that this requirement has been satisfied, every act
based on article 235 must include a detailed explanation of why it
could not be based on any other Treaty provision. Otherwise, the act
might violate the requirement to state reasons set forth in articles 190
and 173 of the Treaty, thereby creating a relevant ground for review. 69
61. Vertrag zur Grindung der Europiischen Gemeinschaften, art. 235, at 333 ("Im Rahmen
des Gemeinsamen Marktes").
62. G. NICOLAYSEN, supra note 22, at 46.
63. Trait6s Institutant les Communaut6s Europ6ennes, art. 235, at 333 ("Dans le fonctionnement du march6 commun").
64. Trattati che Instituiscono leComuniti Europee, art. 235, at 333 ("Nei funzionamento del
mercato commune").
65. Verdragen tot Oprichting van de Europese Gemeemschappen, art. 235, at 333 ("In bet
kader van de gemeenschappelijke markt").
66. See, e.g., Regina v. Pierre Bouchereau, 1977 E.C.R. 1999, 2010 ("The different language
versions of a Community text must be given a uniform interpretation and hence in the case of
divergence between the versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the
purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part.").
67. Everling, supra note 21, at 11.
68. R. LAUWAARS, supra note 42, at 85.
69. See also H. GERICKE, supra note 49, at 61.
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The question arises whether the prerequisite that the Treaty has not
provided the necessary powers is met only when such power is missing
altogether in the Treaty, or also when it is merely insufficient. Some
authors contend that as soon as certain powers regarding the subject
matter to be regulated are provided for in the Treaty, resort to article
235 is excluded. 70 Moreover, they argue that the mere inexpediency of
a substantive power provided in the Treaty does not justify supplementing it with additional powers on the basis of article 235.71 This
rather restrictive interpretation is supported by the argument that the
intensity of every encroachment upon the national legal systems was
carefully considered and deliberately calibrated in each provision at
the time the Treaty provisions were negotiated, and that the Community organs do not have the power to change or disregard this estab72
lished order.
The majority of commentators, however, reject this restrictive interpretation. According to these commentators, article 235 applies
not only if specific powers are not provided for in theTreaty, but also
if they are insufficient. 73 This is convincingly explained by the function of article 235, which was designed to overcome deficiencies of the
specific powers in the provisions of the Treaty. 74 Furthermore, the
restrictive interpretation according to which article 235 is only applicable in the complete absence of authority would lead to the implausible result that the Community organs would have more opportunities
to intervene in areas where the Treaty provides no authorization than
in those for which there already exist some, albeit deficient, power to
75
take action.
v.

"Appropriate measures"

Article 235 empowers the Council to take "appropriate measures"
if action to attain an objective of the Treaty proves necessary. The
nature of these measures ultimately determines the practical importance of article 235. It is commonly held that such measures could be
adopted not only in all legal forms mentioned in article 189 of the
70. E. WOHLFAHRT,

U. EVERLING,

H. GLAESNER

&

R.

SPRUNG, DIE EUROPXISCHE WIRT-

SCHAFrSGEMEINSCHAFr Art. 235 ann. 4 (1960).
71. See D. DORN, supra note 22, at 42 (and source cited therein).
72. H. RABE, DAS VERORDNUNGSRECHT DER EUROPALISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFr 71 (1963).
73. Lauwaars, supra note 18, at 106; R. LAUWAARS, supra note 42, at 86; A. BLECKMANN,

EUROPARECHT 146 (1985); Behrens, supra note 47, at 280; Schwartz, Art. 235 ann. 48, in 3
KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG 1117 (1983).
74. G. NICOLAYSEN, supra note 22, at 47.

75. See Behrens, supra note 47, at 280.
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Treaty, 76 but also as a decision sui generis:77 i.e., every measure is
judged appropriate which succeeds in achieving the objectives of the
78
Treaty either more effectively or more readily.
b. Limitation of Article 235 by Article 236
Some commentators express the view that Community institutions
exercise sovereign powers of the Member States when acting on the
basis of article 235. They consequently regard this article as authorizing wide-ranging, autonomous Treaty amendments, including the cre79
ation of new areas of authority.
The more convincing view, however, holds that the legislative organs of the Community cannot create new powers on the basis of article 235,80 because, unlike national legislatures, they do not have the
authority to create such new powers (compdtence de la compitence;
Kompetenz-Kompetenz). 81 The Council is authorized only to put powers already existing in the Treaty into concrete form, e.g., by supplementing existing means of action with more incisive ones. 82 Article
235 was designed to enable Community organs to achieve goals more
efficiently within the sphere of their exisiting authority, but not to expand Community authority vis-d-vis the Member States. 83 For this latter purpose, article 236 was conceived, requiring ratification of every
amendment by all Member States in accordance with their national
constitutions. Commentators have criticized the present application
of article 235 for disregarding this limitation by extending Community
action to subject matters which could not - at least not with certainty
84
- be attributed to the EEC's existing powers.
76. However, Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson, GmbH, 1973 E.C.R. 897,
suggests that the Council has to show a real need in order to use justly the form of a regulation
rather than a directive. See Sasse & Yourow, supra note 48, at 101.
77. R. LAUWAARS, supra note 42, at 87.
78. Schwartz, supra note 58, at 223.
79. D. EHLE & G. MEIER, EWG-WARENVERKEHR 14 (1971).
80. R. LAUWAARS, supra note 42, at 89.
81. H. GERICKE, supra note 49, at 89; Everling, supra note 21, at 14; B. BEUTLER, supra note
55, at 77.
82. R. LAUWAARS, supra note 42, at 100.
83. See Everling, supra note 21, at 14. However, Everling's next point - that the difference
between articles 235 and 236 consists in the fact that the former does not alter the Treaty because
no additional power is created - is too apodictical: it derives an "is" statement from an "ought"
statement although it is logically impossible to do so.
84. See Tizzano, supra note 37, at 42:
[L]e recours Al'article 235, au lieu d'attribuer des pouvoirs d'action plus incisifs dans des
mati~res o existait d6ji la compet6nce communautaire, a servi essentiellement A &endre
cette dernire A des matiires pour lesquelles elle n'existait pas, ou, i tout le moins, elle ne
pouvait pas etre affirm6e avec certitude.
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It is indeed apparent that the application of article 235 of the
Treaty must find its limits in article 236; otherwise, the latter would be
stripped of its meaning. Admittedly, the lengthy and cumbersome formal amendment procedure does not adequately address the urgency
and importance of keeping pace with economic developments. However, the use of article 235 cannot replace amendment of the Treaty.
The length of the amendment procedure simply reflects the concept
that a change in the basis of the consensus on which the European
agreement is founded not only requires a unanimous decision, but
must be subjected to all the constitutional safeguards necessary to secure individual rights directly affected by supranational rules. It cannot be assumed that the Member States who agreed to the inclusion of
article 235 in the Treaty wanted this provision to elude such safeguards. Therefore, any "amendment of the Treaty through the backdoor of article 235," not just those deemed "substantial," might be
inadmissible.8 5
2.

The View of the European Court of Justice

The main question concerning the application of article 235 upon
which the Court has elaborated is the condition that the Treaty "has
not provided the necessary powers"; i.e., the subsidiary nature of the
provision. According to the Court, objective8 6analysis of this condition
of applicability is subject to judicial review.
In Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson GmbH, 7 the
Court held that recourse to article 235 was justified in the interest of
legal certainty. Commentators have deduced from this opinion that
the Court rejected a restrictive interpretation of article 235, which
would have limited its function to filling lacunae in a narrow sense.88
They argue that the Court found the application of article 235 warranted for the regulation in question, even though article 113 of the
Treaty was conceivable as a legal basis. It is certainly true that the
Court did not follow the narrowest possible interpretation in its decision. It must be borne in mind, however, that the regulation in question, on the value of goods for customs purposes, was adopted at a
time when the Common Customs Tariff did not yet exist. During the
transitional period, article 113 was not yet applicable, making recourse
85. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 75 (2d ed. 1985).
86. E.C. Commission v. E.C. Council, 1988 CoMM. MKT. L. REP. 131 (Re Generalized
Tariff Preferences).
87. Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson GmbH, 1973 E.C.R. 897.
88. Meier, supra note 44, at 42.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 12:471

to article 235 more a question of necessity than of choice.8 9
In later decisions, the Court stated, contrary to the allegedly broad
interpretation in Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven, that the use of article
235 as a legal basis for a Community measure was justified only where
no other Treaty provision gave Community institutions the necessary
power to adopt the measure in question. 9° Similarly, the Court held
that article 235 could be used only on a subsidiary basis in cases where
the necessary powers were not provided elsewhere in the Treaty. 91
Moreover, it declared that as long as there is no lacuna in the Treaty,
92
recourse to article 235 is not possible.
A question related to the element of subsidiarity in article 235
which the Court has addressed is whether article 235 applies only in
the total absence of any specific provisions in the Treaty, or whether it
is also applicable where the existing powers are merely inadequate.
With respect to the narrower interpretation (supported by the argument that, otherwise, specific provisions would be superfluous or could
be substantially modified), the Court held:
[A] narrow interpretation of Article 235, which finds not the slightest
support in its wording, appears unwarranted. The applicability of this
rule is provided expressly for those cases where the Treaty has not laid
down the powers necessary to attain one of the Community's objectives.
Consequently the express provision93of inadequate powers does not mean
that this condition is not satisfied.
The Court has touched upon the question of whether the elements
of article 235 should be interpreted widely or more narrowly in other
proceedings. In In re GeneralisedTariff Preferences,94 the Court held
that in order for article 235 to apply, assistance to developing countries would have to be acknowledged as an objective of the Treaty. It
found that the preamble and article 3(k) of the Treaty could be given a
wide interpretation, beyond their explicit wording, in order to justify
this. As to the objectives of the Treaty, the application of article 235
in that case would have required an extensive interpretation of the
Treaty. On the other hand, in order to satisfy the requirement that the
89. E.C. Commission v. E.C. Council, supra note 86, at 147.
90. Id. at 131, 141 (concerning the question of which provision of the Treaty empowered the
Council to adopt the regulation applying generalized tariff preferences with respect to certain
products originating in developing countries).
91. Id. at 146. See also United Kingdom v. E.C. Council, 1988 CoMM. MKT. L. REP. 543,
552 (Re Agricultural Hormones), where the Court stated "that the application of article 235
cannot be considered if the Community has the power to act under another provision."
92. E.C. Commission v. E.C. Council, 1989 COMM. MKT. L. REP. 870, 883 (Re Draft

Budget).
93. Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson GmbH, supra note 87, at 912.
94. E.C. Commission v. E.C. Council, supra note 86, at 146.
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necessary powers must not be provided for in the Treaty, a restrictive
interpretation of article 113 would be needed. The Court stated that it
had
grave doubts whether such a method of interpretation - extensive interpretation of the objectives and hence of the jurisdiction of the Community and restrictive interpretation of its means of action and thus
hindering these means - can be reconciled with the system of the Community treaties, which are designed to attain limited objectives using effective means. 95

In an earlier case, the Advocate-General had given a broad interpretation to article 235, stating that "article 235 exists precisely to vest
in the Community whatever powers it may need."' 96 A misunderstanding of article 235 is reflected in the Advocate-General's opinion
in Syndicat Nationaldes FabricantsRaffineurs d'Huiles de Graissagev.
Groupement d'Intirit Economique "Inter-Huiles." 97 The Council's
Directive of June 16, 1975 on the disposal of waste oils had been based
partly on article 235. The Advocate-General reasoned that the directive was an "element in the Community policy on the protection of the
environment, the necessary powers for the implementation of which
were not provided for by the Treaty," 98 which strongly suggests that
the protection of the environment, despite the fact that environmental
policies were not mentioned anywhere in the Treaty, was seen as an
"objective of this Treaty." Such an expansive interpretation of the
goals of the Community represents a considerable extension of the
provision's scope.
In connection with claims involving the application of article 235,
the Court has repeatedly pointed out that failure to provide exact reasoning for applying article 235 amounts to an infringement of essential
procedural requirements.9 9 The stringent scrutiny of this procedural
requirement means that one cannot simply invoke article 235 whenever it is convenient to do so.
The two most recent Court decisions deal with the relationship between articles 235 and 128 of the Treaty, and concern the field of social policy, more precisely the area of education, which is of growing
importance. In 1987, the Council issued a decision adopting the Euro95. Id. at 147.
96. Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities,
1971 E.C.R. 285, 293.
97. Syndicat National des Fabricants Raffineurs d'Huiles de Graissage et Autres v. Groupement d'Int&rt Economique "Inter-Huiles" etAutres, 1983 E.C.R. 555.
98. Id. at 572.
99. E.C. Commission v. E.C. Council, supra note 86, at 131. As to article 190, see ReweHandelsgesellschaft Nord mbH v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, 1981 E.C.R. 1805; Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, 1982 CoMM. MKT. L. REP. 449.
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pean Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students ("ERASMUS") °0 based on article 128 and article 235. The
adoption of the Decision on the dual legal basis of these two articles
followed lengthy debates within the Council due to the divergent views
on this issue. The Council eventually departed from the Commission's
suggestion which referred only to article 128. The Commission then
brought an action for annulment against the decision, challenging the
Council's use of article 235 in establishing ERASMUS. The Court
adopted a view which tends to be more restrictive of the powers
granted to the Community than that held by the Commission. It decided that, as far as actions envisaged by the decision concerned the
sphere of research, article 128 did not suffice as the legal basis and
that, as a consequence, the necessary powers had not been provided
for under the Treaty within the meaning of article 235.101 It therefore
dismissed the Commission's application for annulment. In spite of
this "conservative"' 10 2 approach regarding the scope of Community
powers, the Court pointed out that the SEA had enlarged considerably
the Community's field of action and that if the ERASMUS decision
had been adopted after the entry into force of the SEA, it could have
been based on the new article 130(g) without having to rely on article
235.
In a decision rendered on the same day, 10 3 the Court dealt with a
legislative decision (87/569/EEC) laying down an action program for
the vocational training of young people on the basis of article 128 of
the Treaty. The Council had brought an action claiming that the decision had been issued on an insufficient legal basis. It therefore found
that article 235 needed to be added as a legal basis. Surprisingly, the
Court ruled in this instance that the existing legal basis was sufficient.
Reiterating his opinion in the ERASMUS case, the Advocate-General
maintained that article 128 did not permit the Community institutions
to undertake directly or to finance concrete action intended to implement a common vocational training policy. For this reason, and in the
absence of any other provision allowing the adoption of such measures, the Advocate-General concluded that the Council ought to have
100. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 166) 20 (1987).
101. Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities,
1989 E.C.R. 1425.
102. The Court's view that article 235 had to be included as the legal basis for the Decision
suggests that the Court adopted a cautious approach vis-d-vis an expansive interpretation of existing Community powers.
103. United Kingdom v. Council of the European Communities, 1988 COMM. MKT. L. REP.
789 (Re Vocational Training Program).
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based its decision on article 235 as well. Having neglected to do so,
the Council had acted ultra vires.
The Court, however, rejected this view and, adopting an expansive
interpretation of the existing powers, held that the program at issue
did not exceed the limits of the powers conferred on the Council by
article 128 of the Treaty. In its reasoning, the Court evoked the theory of implied powers: 1°4 "The fact that the implementation of a common vocational training policy is provided for precludes any
interpretation of that provision which would mean denying the Community the means of action needed to carry out that common policy
10 5
effectively."
The two recent cases mentioned above are based on rather contrary lines of argumentation. The Court's reasoning in the second case
suggests a return °6 to an expansive interpretation of the powers enumerated in the Treaty and a recourse to the theory of implied powers,
thereby avoiding the need to base legal acts on article 235. This reasoning, which departs from the over-extensive interpretation of article
235 to cover Community acts on an uncertain legal basis, is particularly ingenious. Bearing in mind that the principle of teleological interpretation is increasingly relied upon by the Court, a wide
interpretation of already-existing Community powers is likely to yield
greater possibilities for "adapting" them to new subject matters than
the more circumscribed interpretation of article 235. This new approach could also have the advantage of obviating the cumbersome
requirement of unanimity laid down in article 235.
C.

Conclusions

An analysis of the academic literature on article 235 reveals that
those opinions prevail which, by relying either on the Court's case law
or on an extensive interpretation, conclude that article 235 yields a
virtually unlimited discretionary power to Community organs. Contrary to the assumptions of some authors, the Court's opinions themselves, however, do not show consistency in arguing for a wide
interpretation of article 235.107 In the Vocational Training Pro104. Compare Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421 (1819): "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
105. United Kingdom v. Council of the European Communities, supra note 103, at 794. See
also id. at 789.
106. See Gaja, Hay & Rotunda, Instrumentsfor Legal Integration in the European Community - A Review, in 1(2)'INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW (1986).
107. Compare United Kingdom v. Council of the European Communities, supra note 103;
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gramme case, the Court seemed to pursue a new strategy to justify the
extension of Community activity, namely a teleological interpretation
of already-existing Community powers. This strategy appears to be
contrary to that followed in the ERASMUS case, where the Court
relied on a broad interpretation of article 235. With its new approach,
the Court not only avoids the burdensome amendment procedure
under article 236 of the Treaty, but also the requirement of unanimity
under article 235. This change in strategy by the Court may, however,
pose potential offense to national constitutional principles, which is at
least as objectionable as a broad interpretation of article 235.108 Even
if the Court's decisions sometimes seem to protect the Member States'
sphere of rights, the Court's emphasis has clearly been on promoting
further European integration.
Despite the fact that the Court's rulings do not unequivocally support the opinions of academic writers on this subject, the arguments of
the latter are nevertheless often convincing. The Community is a dynamic arrangement whose intrinsic feature is constant evolution. Article 235 has been designed to facilitate this process. Attempts to
narrowly construe article 235 in order to contain the expansion of
Community activity run counter to this concept. Yet a balance needs
to be struck between facilitating integration and preserving the fundamental legal and political orders of the Member States. This could be
achieved by taking these fundamental parameters into consideration
when interpreting and applying article 235, the same way its telos the promotion of integration - is presently taken into account. Indeed, one could argue that the preservation of the constitutional principles of the Member States ought to be considered part of the
objectives of the Community and therefore taken into account in every
teleological interpretation. Should this ultimately prove insufficient to
achieve the Community's goals, the only appropriate remedy is an
amendment of the Treaty, not a hyperextensive interpretation of article 235.

II.

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE EXERCISE OF POWER
UNDER ARTICLE 235 AND FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES

The main characteristic features of the unique supranational European regime are the transfer of extensive legislative powers from the
Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities, supra note
101.
108. Many of the provisions which the Court interprets expansively allow Community organs to issue acts on the basis of a majority vote.
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Member States to the Community, the possibility of decision-making
by majority vote within the Council, 1° 9 the direct applicability of
many legislative measures, 110 the supremacy of Community law,III as
well as the monopoly on interpretation of Community law vested in a
Court of the European Communities. 1 2 Compared to membership in
other international organizations, the "sovereignty sacrifice" made by
the Member States of the Community is considerable. In addition,
several "open-ended" provisions, such as articles 43, 103, 113 and,
most importantly, articles 100 and 235, leave broad discretion to Community institutions. The apprehension has been expressed - notably
in areas of a non-economic nature - that the unpredictability of an
increasingly extensive use of these discretionary powers could repre3
sent a danger to the sovereign rights retained by the Member States. "
In order to determine whether the Community has an obligation to
avoid or solve potential conflicts between the interpretation and application of article 235 and constitutional guarantees of the Member
States, it must be established that Community organs, in their actions,
are legally required to take these principles into account in some way.
Before inquiring into which constitutional guarantees are potentially
endangered by an extensive application of article 235, it must be
shown that the interpretation of Community power on which Community decisions rely is to some extent bound by, and not detached from,
these guarantees.
In conjunction with the rule of supremacy of Community law over
national law, the Court has consistently held that Community law and
the law of the Member States represent two distinct and separate bodies of law 14 The relationship between the legal system of the Community and those of the Member States is, however, more aptly
described as one of constant communication and interpenetration.'
109. See notably EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 100A (inserted into the Treaty by art. 18
of the Single European Act).
110. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 189, para. 2.
111. See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629,
643.
112. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 177(a).
113. A manifestation of these concerns is the action brought in the Irish Supreme Court
alleging that the SEA violated the constitutional requirement that Ireland remain a "sovereign
independent democratic State." Crotty v. An Taoiseach and Others, 1987 COMM. MKT. L. REP.
666, 690. See Lang, The Irish Court Case Which Delayed the Single European Act: Crotty v. An
Taoiseach and Others, 24 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 709 (1987).
114. See, most importantly, N.V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming Van
Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.J. 1, 12, 1963 CoMM. MKT.
L. REP. 105; Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593, 1964 COMM. MKT. L. REP. 425.
115. See Tomuschat, supra note 42, at 62. See also Pescatore, Das Zusammenwirken der
Gemeinschaftsrechtsordnungmit den nationalen Rechtsordnungen, 5 EuR 307 (1976).
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On the one hand, the Member States have agreed to acknowledge sec-

ondary Community law as directly binding in their legal spheres (pursuant to article 189, paragraph 2 of the Treaty); on the other hand, the

Court has increasingly tended to recognize the common constitutional

tradition of the Member States as a source of Community law,"16
which has resulted in the opening of the two legal systems towards
7
each other." 1
It has been argued that there is no qualitative difference between

Community law and the law of the Member States, merely different
legislative and judicial procedures dictated by needs of rationalization.
If one departs from the assumption that there is no differentia specifica
between the two legal orders, structural homogeneity plainly demands

that the shared values of the Member States which have reached the
status of principles of law be respected within the legal order of the

Community. "811
This opinion is, however, not undisputed. Conflicting views on
how to interpret Community law frequently arise because neither the
Treaty nor the case law of the Court has yet provided a coherent set of
rules for the interpretation of Community provisions. '9 Furthermore,
recourse cannot be taken either to the rules of interpretation developed
within the legal systems of the Member States or to the rules set forth
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 20 for international
treaties, because neither is directly applicable. 12
116. See Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 425, 1970 COMM. MKT. L.
REP. 112; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Getreide und
Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1134, 1972 COMM. MKT. L. REP. 255; Nold, Kohlen-und
Baustoffgrolohanlong v. E.C. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 507, 1974 COMM. MKT. L. REP.
338.
117. See Tomuschat, supra note 42, at 63.
118. Id. (and sources cited therein).
119. The difficulties national courts face when having to interpret Community law are illustrated in the opinion of the English Court of Appeal in H.P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger S.A.,
1974 COMM. MKT. L. REP. 91, 119:
How different [as compared to English laws] is this Treatyl It lays down general principles.
It expresses its aims and purposes.... But it lacks precision. It uses words and phrases
without defining what they mean. An English lawyer would look for an interpretation
clause, but he would look in vain.... Seeing these differences, what are the English courts to
do when they are faced with a problem of interpretation? They must follow the European
pattern. No longer must they examine the words in meticulous detail. No longer must they
argue about the precise grammatical sense. They must look to the purpose or intent.
120. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (1980), entered intoforce Jan. 27, 1980.
121. Member States' rules cannot apply because they lack uniformity; compare the continental tradition of interpretation with the rules of interpretation under the common law system of
the United Kingdom. The Community differs substantially from any other international regime,
and article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention has been regarded as inapplicable for several reasons.
Groux notes that the Convention entered into force on January 27, 1980, and that according to
article 4 it applies only to treaties which have been concluded after its entry into force. Groux,
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Thus, two contrary opinions exist as to the applicable rule of interpretation on this issue. One view suggests that article 235 be interpreted restrictively in view of constitutional considerations,122 while

the other maintains that the Treaty should be interpreted teleologically,1 23 - i.e., according to its objectives and purposes - whenever
the wording does not yield unequivocal results or at least sufficiently
precise guidelines. The reason for this view is that the dynamic and
political character of the Treaty calls for a method of interpretation
which takes into account the fact that the economic process, which
represents the basis of the European arrangement, is constantly
24
evolving.'
The use of general principles of law as guidelines for the interpretation of all Treaty provisions 25 is problematic. It inevitably entails a

restrictive interpretation which, if applied as a rule or concept, would
be contrary to the nature of the Treaty as traitd cadre or instrument of
integration. 26 The Treaty should not be interpreted in any way which

would unduly restrict the Community's freedom of action, bearing in
mind the constitutional provisions of the Member States. On the other
hand, the Community legal order does acknowledge the "general principles common to the laws of the Member States,"' 27 and the Court
Convergences et Conflits, dans lInterpritation du Traiti CEE, entre la Pratique Suivie par les
Etats Membres et laJurisprudence de laCour de Justice des Communautis Europiennes, in DO
DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION: LIBER AMICORUM PIERRE PESCATORE
275, 281 (1987). Furthermore, some Member States have not ratified the Convention (notably
France), and the Court has never acknowledged international instruments as binding unless all
Member States are either members thereof or have cooperated in their conclusion. See Nold v.
Commission, supra note 116, at 507. The argument could be made, however, that the Vienna
Convention has in some areas, including the rules of interpretation, merely codified existing customary law which in turn is authoritative for the EEC, being a legal entity under international
law.
122. As indicated by von Meibom, supra note 53, at 2165.
123. See Zuleeg, Die Auslegung des europaischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, 5 EuR 97 (1969);
Hexner, TeleologicalInterpretation of Basic Instruments of Public International Organisations, II
EuR 239 (1964); Bleckmann, Teleologische und dynamische Auslegung des Europdischen
Gemeinschaftsrechts, 11 EuR 239 (1976). This view seems to be supported by several statements
of the Court. See, e.g., Metallurgiki Halyps A.E. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 4261, 4268;
Polydor Limited v. Harlequin Record Shops Limited, 1982 E.C.R. 329.
124. See Everling, supra note 21, at 5. Compare also the statement of the ICJ in Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (Advisory Opinion of July 20): ("When the
organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment
of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not
ultra vires the organization.")
125. As suggested by D. DORN, supra note 22, at 71.
126. Additionally, conflicts could arise between an overly restrictive interpretation of Treaty
provisions and the Member State's 'obligations' to "facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks" and to "abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the
objectives" of the Treaty. EEC Treaty, supra note 1,at art. 5.
127. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 215, para. 2. See also B. BEUTLER, supra note 55,
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may use them as "a curb upon Council acts." 128 It seems legitimate to
assume, therefore, that in those areas where the Treaty grants considerable discretionary power to the Community institutions, these principles ought to be relied upon as guidelines for the interpretation of
such power. It may accordingly be suggested that the outer limits for
the interpretation of an open-ended provision such as article 235 are
staked out by the fundamental constitutional principles common to all
Member States.
A.

The DemocraticPrinciple: Lawmaking in the EEC

In order to establish whether a rule possesses the status of a general principle of law, an accurate comparative analysis of the respective legal systems of the Member States of the EEC would be needed.
Short of this, it seems reasonable to start from the assumption that the
principles of democracy and the Rule of Law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip)belong to the oldest and most deeply-rooted constitutional traditions
common to all European States.' 29 Apart from their quality as general
principles of law common to all Member States, these concepts have
been developed from within the legal structure of the Community itself by the Court's reliance upon them in several decisions during the
last decade. The Court has addressed the principle of the Rule of Law
through the recognition of some of its components: the principle of the
protection of legitimate expectations 30 and the postulate of legal certainty.' 3' The Court has also recently acknowledged the democratic
principle as a fundamental Community principle, without recourse to
the notion of general principles of law as a source of international
law.' 32 It has also stated that the principle is unequivocally expressed
through the participation of the European Parliament in the legislative
33
process.'
Democratic political systems can be characterized as having the
at 181, maintaining that general principles of law are of importance in the legal order of the
Community.
128. Sasse & Yourow, supra note 48, at 100 n.93.
129. See Klein, Entwicklungsperspektiven fir das Europdische Parlament,22 EuR 97, 100
(1987), relying upon A. BLECKMANN, STUDIEN ZUM EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT
159-84 (1986).
Zucker, 1973 E.C.R. 723,
130. See, e.g., Westzucker GmbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ftir
731; Compagnie Industrielle et Agricole du Comt6 de Loheac v. E.C. Commission, 1976 E.C.R.
645; S.A. Ancienne Maison Marcel Bauche v. French Customs Administration, 1978 E.C.R.
383, 402.
131. See e.g., Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH, 1962
E.C.R. 45; Theo Nebe v. E.C. Commission, 1970 E.C.R. 145, 151.
132. Maizena GmbH v. E.C. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3393, 3424.
133. S.A. Roquette Freres v. E.C. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333, 3360.
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following elements: lawmaking by a democratically elected parliament; an executive branch whose actions are restrained by the laws
("the binding force of the law"); and the supervision of the government by the legislative body. Plainly, the concept underlying the democratic principle is that every exercise of power needs legitimation.
This legitimation can only be achieved through participation in the
creation of the law by the individuals subjected to it, as well as by
accountability to an elected body of those exercising public power.
At first glance, it may seem implausible that membership in the
Community could in any way be detrimental to the democratic structure of a State, since membership itself presupposes a democratic
structure in a potential and prospective member. 3 4 Yet the powers
which have been transferred to the Community by the Member States
in accordance with their constitutional procedures originally belonged
to democratically legitimized national legislatures. The Community
organs now exercising these powers are the Council and the Commission, which are both composed of representatives of the executive
power. The Commission comprises the administrative officials of the
Community, while the Council consists of members (for the most part
ministers) of national governments who, according to national laws,
are not endowed with the power to originate binding law (i.e., to legislate), but only to execute such law. Also, these members of the national executive branches have, at best, indirect democratic legitimacy
since they are most frequently appointed, not elected, to their offices.
Moreover, the deliberative process within the Council lacks the
publicity and openness normally expected of a democratic process
since, according to the Council's own Rules of Procedure, it is held in
camera.'a5 Additionally, the rising importance of organs such as the
Committee of Permanent Representatives ("COREPER") 3 6 in the
legislative process of the Community "exacerbate[s] the issue of accountability since the operation of these bodies is far less transparent
37
... than the fully fledged political organs."'
The Community does have a democratically elected body, the European Parliament. However, in spite of the undeniable increase in its
134. See Frowein, Die Rechtliche Bedeutung des Verfassungsprinzipsder Parlamentarischen
Demokratiefir den Europaischen Integrationsprozess, 18 EuR 301 (1983).
135. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 3(1).
136. The COREPER was established by the Council under article 151, paragraph 2, of the
EEC Treaty, and confirmed by article 4 of the Merger Treaty of April 8, 1965 (Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the EC, 1967 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 152) 2
(1967)).
137. Weiler, Community, Member States and EuropeanIntegration:Is the Law Relevant?, 21
J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 39, 50-51 (1982) (emphasis added).
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importance since the SEA, 138 it still plays a patently subordinate role
in the legislative process. 139 Theoretically, the Parliament has a very
powerful sanction at its disposal: under article 144 of the Treaty, it has
the ultimate right to dismiss the Commission. Such a vote of no confidence is, however, not likely ever to be exercised and, even if it were, it
is directed only against the Commission and not the Council, which is
the more influential legislative organ of the Community.
It is therefore clear that the paramount characteristic of a democratic process - that there be no legislation without democratic endorsement and public accountability - is lacking in the legislative
process of the Community. Because the legislative powers of the
Community are monopolized by the Council and the Commission, the
Community has repeatedly been criticized as suffering from an acute
"democratic deficit."" 40 The Community itself is well aware of the
need for democratic legitimation of its efforts towards integration, integration which increasingly extend beyond the original plan of a
1 41
purely economic Community.
One could argue that the Member States originally accepted the
Treaty according to their national constitutions and the provisions in
the Treaty for the transfer of sovereign rights. For this reason, it
could be said that the present "legislation by the executive" in the
Community has been given democratically legitimized approval. The
problem, however, does not lie with the specific provisions conferring
single legislative powers, which arguably enjoy full legitimacy, but
rather with open-ended provisions like article 235, whose range of potential applications could not have been predicted at the time of the
Treaty's ratification. 42 Even under the assumption that the content of
the Treaty, as seen at the time of accession, has been accepted by the
national legislators and thereby indirectly democratically legitimized,
the "creeping" change of the Treaty's scope by the hyperextension of
138. See notably Single European Act, supra note 33, at arts. 6, 8 and 9.
139. It should be noted, however, that lately the Court has emphasized that consultation
with the Parliament must be regarded as an essential element of Community legislation. See
Roquette Frires v. E.C. Council, supra note 133, at 3360-61.
140. Zuleeg, supra note 43, at 40.
141. "The need for this [democratic] legitimation increases with the scope of the tasks."
Vedel Report, 4 BULL. EC, Supp. 4/72, at 32 (1972). See also Tagung des Europaischen Rates
der Staats- und Regierungschefs am & und 9. Dezember 1989 in Strassburg, 45 EUROPA-ARCHly
D5, DI0 (1990), wherein the European Council stressed that it is of essential importance that
every further step taken towards an economic and monetary union be in accordance with the
fundamental requirement of democratic legitimacy.
142. This argument obviously does not apply to the most recent Members of the Community. New Members are supposed to incorporate the whole acquis communautaire into their
legal orders. See T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 219-20
(1988).
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flexible provisions such as article 235 remains problematic. 143 It is evident that the unanimity requirement of article 235 which allows members of the executive to veto a decision does not adequately
compensate for a lack of democratic participation.
Considerations and preoccupations such as the ones just mentioned are clearly reflected elsewhere in the Treaty. The formal
amendment procedure provided for in article 23614 contains all the
safeguards necessary to let the Community process conform to national constitutional provisions. The amendment procedure is without
doubt more cumbersome and lengthy than the one provided in article
235, but for good reasons. 145 It would be very problematic - and
detrimental to the principle of democracy - to regard article 235 as a
convenient loophole through which the Community's authority could
146
be extended at the expense of ratification by national legislatures.
B.

The Principle of the Rule of Law

As a general rule, individuals are not directly subject to duties and
rights under rules of traditional public international law. 147 The Community, however - unlike other international entities - exercises
sovereign powers over the subjects of the Member States to a consider148
able degree.
The principle of the Rule of Law is the most important safeguard
for the individual subject against any exercise of public power in the
modern constitutional state. 149 The main features of the theoretical
concept of the Rule of Law appear to be common to all Member
States. The formal elements of the separation of powers and the binding force of the law as well as the substantive elements of proportionality, legal certainty and the guarantee of fundamental civil and human
rights can be found in the constitutions of all European states.
143. Compare Weiler, supra note 137, at 51, who maintains that in view of the passage of
time and the profound changes in the operation and interpretation of the document since the
approval of the Treaty of Rome by the national parliaments, the argument that the Treaty itself
legitimizes the current European program is no longer altogether convincing.
144. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 236 (reproduced supra note 40).
145. See Everling, supra note 21, at 14.
146. See Schwartz, supra note 51.
147. There are some notable exceptions, e.g., international instruments protecting human
rights and the international law of war crimes.
148. In Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse adminstratie der belastingen, supra note 114, at 12,

the Court held that "the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights . . . and the subjects of which

comprise not only Member States but also their nationals."
149. From the German concept of "Rechtsstaat;" compare the French "Etat Constitutionnel."
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The Court has consistently held that the Community is bound by
the Rule of Law. It has derived this conclusion from the general principles of law common to the Member States.1 50
Every institution entitled to the exercise of power must be subject
to the above-mentioned limitations, whose function is to secure the
rights of individuals subject to this power. The legal order of the
Community directly affects the citizens of the Member States 51 by
conferring rights and imposing duties upon them. The question
whether the principle of the Rule of Law is being respected within the
Community is therefore crucial from a constitutional point of view.
This is particularly true with regard to article 235. The inherent unpredictability of the scope of application of this provision contrasts
remarkably with the main elements of the principle of the Rule of
Law: namely, the notions of legal certainty, foreseeability and protection of legitimate expectations. These principles represent an integral
part of the justifiable claim that those subject to the laws and their
sanctions should be able to plan their actions in accordance with the
laws.
Some scholars have implicitly suggested that the unanimity requirement in article 235 yields an indirect supervisory mechanism for
the discretionary power conferred on the Community through that
provision, rendering concerns about the Rule of Law unfounded.1 52
However, this argument is hardly convincing. As stated above, the
inherent function of the principle of the Rule of Law is to restrain the
executive power of the State by establishing safeguards and mechanisms to protect the sphere of rights of those subjected to the exercise
of this power. The ability of the representatives of the national governments to exercise a right of veto hardly constitutes such an adequate safeguard. 15 3 One must therefore conclude that a wide and
deliberate application of article 235, possibly in areas not yet determined, does directly and profoundly affect the principle of the Rule of
Law.
C.

National Sovereignty

Sovereignty is the ultimate, all-comprising authority reserved to
the State to exercise power over its citizens and its territory subject
only to limitations of law. The State exercises its sovereignty by, on
150. See supra notes 130 and 131.
151. Especially through the direct applicability of its regulations. EEC Treaty, supra note 1,
at art. 189, para. 2.
152. As suggested by von Meiborn, supra note 53, at 2168.
153. D. DORN, supra note 22, at 87.
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the one hand, making laws and ensuring their enforcement, and, on
the other hand, by ensuring its independence with regard to the international community. Most European States' constitutions contain
provisions which explicitly authorize the State to surrender limited
sovereign rights to supranational entities.1 54 Other Member States
have had to amend their constitutions substantially in order to render
such transfer of sovereign power compatible with their fundamental
laws, which in principle reserve the exercise of sovereign rights exclusively to the State.
The voluntary waiver of specific sovereign rights was the inevitable
sacrifice that went with the creation of an efficient "supra-institution"
with its own powers to take action. The extent of this waiver has,
however, been the source of constant debate and disagreement
throughout the history of integration, giving rise to some serious
predicaments for the Community. A notable example among these
was the crisis of 1965, initiated by the claims of France for more respect for State sovereignty within the Community. As is well known,
the French boycott of Council meetings paralyzed the Community's
work for several months and threatened to break up the European
arrangement. In order to restore normal working conditions, other
Community members consented inter alia to the French demands for
a restatement of the Council's voting procedure and thereby instituted
the "agreement to disagree," 155 commonly known as the Luxembourg
Compromise. 156
The Luxembourg Compromise, whose legally binding force has
generally been denied, nonetheless led to a voting procedure based exclusively on consensus within the Council over the next two decades,
and has received most of the blame for the slow pace of integration
during this period. While proponents of a rapid integration have legitimately criticized the Luxembourg Compromise as being the result of

an inappropriate nationalistic "protectionism," countries favoring a
weak Community still expressed concern that the EEC was unduly
curtailing their sovereign rights.
The entire situation regarding the voting procedure has drastically
changed since the passing of the SEA, which provides for a considerable increase in majority decisions in areas regarding the realization of
154. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 24 (Ger.).
155. A. PARRY & J. OMNAGE, PARRY & HARDY: EEC LAW 31 (2nd ed. 1981).
156. The relevant addition made by France to the Council's projected voting procedure,
which provided that if important issues of particular Member States are at stake, the Council will
try to reach solutions which can be accepted by all Member States, reads: "[W]here very important interests are at stake the discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is
reached." Luxembourg Accords, 3 BULL. EC, at 8 (1966) (emphasis added).
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the Single European Market by 1992.157 The procedural changes introduced by the SEA have exacerbated the problem of encroachment

on national sovereignty. 58 Today, there is growing concern on the
part of sovereignty-conscious Member States regarding plans for a
wider and deeper integration, despite the recognition of the advantages
of integration. The criticism of the proposed European Monetary
Union and an ultimate Political Union of Europe are the most obvious

examples of mounting apprehension.
The issue of State sovereignty has always been linked with the dif-

ferent voting procedures, and problems have always arisen with regard
to a voting procedure which by majority could override the wishes of
Member States. From this perspective, article 235, which requires
unanimity, does not pose a serious threat to State sovereignty since no

decision can be taken without the consent of all Member States. However, article 235 allows the extension of Community action into fields
of national sovereignty to a degree that could not have been envisaged
at the time of the creation of the Community. This encroachment on
sovereignty can hardly be regarded as legitimized by the original ratification of the Treaty, and its extensive application is likely to arouse
sovereignty-conscious States' instincts to protect their sphere of rights.
D. Federalism
For Members - or future Members - of the Community having
federal or regional structures,15 9 the expansive interpretation and application of article 235 poses additional problems stemming from the
dual distribution of powers between the central State and the states or
regions. Again, the cardinal point of departure of this analysis is the
unanimity requirement provided for in article 235, aimed at protecting
157. Eg., EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 100A, para. 1. Note, however, the several substantial exceptions listed in article 100A, paras. 2-5.
158. The meaning of sovereignty in today's situation of worldwide economic and political
interdependence of States is obviously completely different from the antiquated notion of sovereignty prevailing in the 19th century that contributed to the emergence of the two World Wars.
To focus solely on last century's theory of sovereignty would overlook present realities and be
imminently dangerous.
The concerns repeatedly expressed by the United Kingdom relating to an increasingly integrated Europe essentially reflect outdated preoccupations with infringement of national sovereignty. Compare the speech by Margaret Thatcher in Bruges, Belgium on September 20, 1988,
Agence Europe (Doec.), No. 1527 (Oct. 12, 1988). The former British Prime Minister described
the European program, just a few years before the envisaged (and unanimously approved)
achievement of a Single European Market, as a "co-operation between independent sovereign
States," and expressed the view that "to try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the
centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve."
159. Countries with federal structures include Germany, Austria and Belgium. Italy and
Spain have strong regional structures.
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vital interests of the Member States and often invoked in defense of the
procedural impeccability of the provision.
In the case of the protection of sovereign rights of the Member
States, unanimity within the Council is indeed apt to fulfill the task of
securing their interests (except to the extent that Community power
may be extended into areas previously reserved to the Member States).
Council members, as representatives of the (central) States' executives,
are well-suited to represent the interests of "the State" as a whole.
When, however, the concerned entities are ones which, unlike the central State, do not have a vote in the Council, the "protecting function"
of the unanimity requirement becomes illusory.
The chief source of friction in the relationship between the EEC
and the states (of federal States) and regions of Europe has always
been the non-participation of state or regional representatives in EEC
institutions, whose legislation is nonetheless binding on them. In the
Federal Republic of Germany, general provisions like articles 235 and
100 of the Treaty are particularly problematic with respect to the constitutional guarantee of legislative and executive powers of the German Lander. This is due to the increasing application of those general
clauses in peripheral areas of the economic union, such as culture and
environment, which, characteristically in a federal distribution of responsibilities, fall within the sphere of power of the Lander. Illustrative examples of the encroachment of Community legislation upon
Lander competences in the "border areas" of Community power are
the expansion of environmental policy' 6° and, more recently, the passing of the directive on trans-frontier broadcasting ("Television without
Frontiers") 16' against the vehement resistance of the German
Lander,16 2 which according to the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz)
have exclusive authority in the area of broadcasting.
E.

Conclusions

This section has shown how an expansive interpretation and application of article 235 can and has interfered with fundamental national
guarantees such as democracy, the Rule of Law, federalism and, to a
lesser extent, State sovereignty. The guarantees of democracy and the
Rule of Law can be judged as having the quality of general principles
of law which have found a firm place within the legal order of the
160. See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
161. Council Directive, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 298) 23 (1989).
162. Denmark opposed the passage of the directive (which was adopted by a majority, with
Belgium joining Denmark in dissent), arguing that the Community had no competence in the
field of broadcasting.
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Community through the opinions of the Court. The principle of sovereignty of States is an acknowledged keystone of international law.
But neither is true for the principle of federalism. Although several
European States do have a federal, quasi-federal or regional structure,
they do not represent a sufficient majority which would justify acknowledging federalism as a general principle of law. For this reason,
and also because the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the general
principles of law as sources of Community law is still in an initial
stage, to effectively protect constitutional guarantees it is not sufficient
to rely on the common recognition of these principles. It is necessary,
instead, to look for additional safeguards or remedies to secure the
respect of fundamental constitutional guarantees within the European
arrangement.
III.

CONCEIVABLE SAFEGUARDS AND REMEDIES AGAINST
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF NATIONAL PRINCIPLES
THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 235

The unanimity requirement set forth in article 235 could lead one
to conclude that the provision is "safe" from a constitutional point of
view. Such an assumption would, however, prove unjustified in most
cases. Where the constitutional problem of an over-extensive intervention of Community legislation into the sphere of sovereign rights of
the Member States arises, the unanimity requirement within the Council can indeed be regarded as an appropriate safeguard. The Council is
composed of members of the executive, and the central governments of
the Member States can arguably be regarded as having the authority
to decide on a transfer of powers to the Community.1 63
This consideration does not hold, however, when other constitutional problems connected with an extensive application of article 235
arise. As mentioned above, the veto right of members of the executive
is not able to balance the democratic deficit created by a "creeping"
change of the Treaty, the potential interference with the rights of individuals or the progressive loss of powers of the constituents of federal
States. National legislatures, individual subjects and political entities
within federal States exercise their own rights granted to them by the
States' constitutions and often need to be protected against their own
central governments. Therefore, unanimity within the European
163. Since the original transfer of sovereign rights to supranational organizations in most
States requires the approval of the State's legislature, one could also maintain that this consent is
required for any subsequent abandonment of sovereign powers in favor of the Community as
well.
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Council, a governmental body, hardly represents an effective safeguard
against an overpowering EEC.
Following is an analysis of currently existing and potential safeguards against possible violations of national constitutional principles.

A.

The Principle of "Comptence d'Attribution"

The legislative organs of the Community -

the Council and the

Commission - lack the most distinctive and important power of the
national legislature: the power to create powers (KompetenzKompetenz). Community organs, much like organs of traditional international organizations, have limited power to legislate. They may

take only those specific actions which the Treaty explicitly authorizes. 164 The implication of powers within international organizations
is deemed to be restricted by this principle of "compitence
165

d'attribution."

This fundamental Community concept 166 is apparently at variance

with the broad interpretation which some have given to article 235,
according to which the provision grants nearly unlimited authorization to legislate as long as there is some nexus with the Community's
objectives.
Article 235 arguably represents a necessary modification 167 of the
principle of compdtence d'attribution, which, if rigorously pursued,
would keep the Community from reacting speedily and flexibly

enough to economic and political changes. Even if this is true, article
235 cannot be but a rare exception,1 68 "an emergency clause" to the
generally accepted rule of deputed powers.1 69 It is the nature of an
164. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 4: "Each institution shall act within the limits of
the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty" (emphasis added); see also id. at art. 189, para 1.
165. See Advocate-General Lagrange, submissions in Algera v. Assembie Commune de Ia
Communaute Europ6ene du Charbon etde L'Acier, 3 Recueil 159 (1957). The principle of compitence d'attributionis also called the principle of conferred, attributed or delegated powers. See,
e.g., Skubiszewski, Implied Powers of InternationalOrganizations,in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A
TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF S. ROSENNE 867 (Y. Dinstein ed. 1990). H.
RABE, supra note 72, at 70, spoke of "Prinzip der begrenzten Einzelermaichtigung." Regarding
the limitation placed on implied powers by this principle, see, e.g., Skubiszewski, supra. at 867.
166. H. IPSEN, EUROPAISCHES GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT 425 (1972); see also Tizzano, supra
note 37, at 37.
167. B. BEUTLER, supra note 55, at 76. A. BLECKMANN, supra note 73, at 159, calls the
principle a "deficiency" ("Mangel") which is made up for by article 235 of the Treaty.
168. See Usher, supra note 48, at 36: "Art. 235 was obviously intended as an exceptional
measure."
169. A tendency toward a restrictive interpretation of article 235 in view of the principle of
conferred powers is found in von Meibom, supra note 53, at 2168; H. RABE, supra note 72, at
156. Skeptical of this view is Everling, supra note 21, at 17, who claims that the existence of
article 235 itself disproves that there is any such principle.
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exception to a rule that it does not lend itself to an extensive
interpretation.
B.

The Principle of Subsidiarity

The concept of subsidiarity has been developed mainly with regard
to entities within a federal State, where it is considered a fundamental
rule of cooperation between the federal State and its constituents. It
implies that where more than one institution is endowed with powers
to legislate and to administer laws within a legal framework, the larger
unit, i.e., the one having the more general powers, may take action
only after it has been ascertained that the same matter cannot be more
rapidly and efficiently carried out by the smaller unit, i.e., the one hav70
ing more specific competences.1
The principle of subsidiarity also lies at the foundation of the
quasi-federal structure of the Community. It requires the Community
to engage in no operation which could more appropriately and readily
be undertaken on the level of the Member States. Originally invoked
by the Member States in order to guard their spheres of retained sovereign decision-making against constant interference by Community regulations, the Community itself has increasingly turned to the principle
of subsidiarity in an effort to cope with its burgeoning responsibilities.
The subsidiarity principle, traces of which could always be found
throughout the Treaty, 17 1 has been expressly introduced into the
Treaty by the SEA (article 130r, paragraph 4),172 and has subsequently been reconfirmed on several occasions as being a guideline for
173
future Community activities.
With regard to article 235, it has been established that whenever a
certain Community goal has already been attained by unilateral measures taken by the Member States (or where such action is feasible on
170. For a general analysis of the principle of subsidiarity, see STADLER, SUBsIDIARITATSPRINZIP UND F6DERALISMUS: EIN BEITRAG ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN STAATSRECHT (1957); see
also The Subsidiarity Principle, supra note 3.
171. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 189, para 3: "A directive shall be binding, as
to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to
the nationalauthorities the choice of form and methods" (emphasis added).
172. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 130(r), para. 4, reads in pertinent part: "The Community shall take action relating to the environment to the extent to which the objectives referred to
in paragraph I can be attained better at Community level than at the level of the individual
Member States."
173. See, e.g., speech of J. Delors in 43 EUROPA-ARCHiv D340, D341 (1988), and more
recently his address at the College d'Europe, Bruges, Oct. 17, 1989, in which he emphasized the
"absolute necessity [of] ... decentralization of responsibilities, so that we never entrust to a
bigger unit anything that is best done by a smaller one." Today, "all the arguments are in favour
of including the subsidiarity principle as a general principle in the Treaty." EditorialComments:
The Subsidiarity Principle, supra note 3, at 184.
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the national level), action by the Community ceases to be necessary
and article 235 is inapplicable. 174 Thus, the authority of the rule of
subsidiarity has also been acknowledged with respect to this provision.
Consequently, the principle of subsidiarity can legitimately be perceived as putting a curb on an expansive interpretation of article 235.
The principle of subsidiarity is without doubt the most appropriate to
counterbalance growing Community activity within the sphere of reserved powers of European regions and states within a federation.
C. Participationof National Parliamentsin the Legislative Process
Could the problem of the "democratic deficit" in the Community
be alleviated by increasing the participation of national parliaments in
the Community's legislative process? It has been argued that it would
be incompatible with the supranational character of the Community if
national parliaments directly or indirectly controlled the decisionmaking process of the Community. 175 The reason for this is said to be
that the Community, as an entity of limited powers defined by the
Treaty, must at least have supreme decision-making power within
those limits. 17 6 It would be an obvious contradiction to the spirit and
nature of the Treaty to have the national parliaments play a decisive
role in the Community's lawmaking process. But at least in areas
where the Community competence is not unequivocally delineated and
the Treaty thus does not provide the aforementioned limits within
which the Community should exercise its autonomous powers, as is
true of article 235, the participation of national parliaments in the decision-making process seems to be both conceivable (without contradicting the Community order) and desirable, in view of the enhanced
public accountability it would provide.
There are different ways in which national parliaments could influence the Council's deliberating process. The first possibility is the exercise of monitoring powers over the members of the Council in their
capacity as members of the national governments. It is apparent that
the degrees and forms of answerability of the executive to the parliament will vary considerably. Yet in every parliamentary democracy
the executive is ultimately controlled by, and (if one considers the possibility of dismissal of the government) to some extent also dependent
174. Schwartz, EG-Rechtsetzungsbefugnisse, Insbesondere nach Artikel 235: Zusschliesslich
oder Konkurrierend? 11 EuR 32 (1986).
175. Newman, The Impact of National Parliamentson the Development of Community Law,
in Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION: LIBER AMICORUM PIERRE PES-

CATORE 481, 484 (1987); Steffani, Einfihrung, in PARLAMENTARISMUS OHNE TRANSPARENZ
253 (W. Steffani ed. 1973).
176. Newman, supra note 175, at 484.
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on, the approval of the legislature. As more and more Community
decisions are taken on a majority basis, however, this indirect means of
democratic control progressively loses its importance.
The second conceivable way for national parliaments to influence
Council decisions has been more relevant in practice: the parliaments
of most Member States have instituted monitoring and participation
procedures aimed at the Council's activities. Although detailed studies 177 of these procedures show that they rarely ever exceed the stage
of formal debates and are thus unlikely to have any notable impact on
the Community's decisions, 178 there is scope for developing them further. 179 Furthermore, the indirect influence of national parliaments
within the various Community committees is estimated to be of con80
siderable importance.1
However, participation of national parliaments in the legislative
process of the Community would pose an additional procedural hurdle, which, even if unlikely to completely prevent any decision from
being made, could undesirably protract those decisions without being
very effective, and therefore without achieving the desired democratic
legitimation. Such participation is also likely to water down the concept of an autonomous supra-institution with powers of its own, making its own decisions. Every expansion of the national parliaments'
influence on the Community's decisions should carefully balance national aspirations for more democratic scrutiny with the interests of an
independent Community. It is doubtful whether the monitoring procedures of the national legislatures are the best possible means of securing democratic legitimacy in the application of any open-ended
provision of the Treaty.
D. Amendment of Article 235: Democratic Legitimacy Through
Approval, Not Mere Consultation, of the European
Parliament
In 1972 the Commission instituted a Working Party to examine
the issue of enlargement of the powers of the European Parliament.
The Working Group issued a Report which recognized inter alia the
importance of enhancing the participation of the Parliament in areas
177. E. THbNE-WILLE, DIE PARLAMENTE DER EG 134 (1984); see also C. SASSE,
REGIERUNGEN

-

PARLAMENTE

-

MINISTERRAT,

ENISCHEIDUNGSPROZESSE

IN

DER

EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT (1975).

178. An overview of these procedures can be found in E. THONE-WILLE, supra note 177, at
105-34. A less comprehensive but more recent examination appears in Newman, supra note 175,

at 485-94.
179. See Newman, supra note 175, at 497.
180. E. THONE-WILLE, supra note 177, at 134-35.
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which are decisive for the evolution and development of the Community's "constitutional" framework.""' Among other recommendations, 18 2 the Report suggested that the adoption of legislative acts
under article 235 be made dependent on approval by the
83
Parliament.
The main justification for the Parliament's participation in the exercise of the discretionary power under article 235 is that every time
Community powers are extended, the powers of national parliaments
are curtailed. For the reasons already mentioned, participation of national parliaments in the Community's decision-making process is,
however, somewhat problematic. A logical "second choice" would be
to entrust the European Parliament with a supervisory role. Even if
the Parliament is not yet structured to replace democratic safeguards
provided by national legislatures, t8 4 this should not mean that ultimate decision-making power should be left exclusively to the Council,
whose structure does not bear any resemblance to the national
legislatures.
Proposals to strengthen the role of the Parliament are, however,
not unanimously supported. The important argument has been made
that the Parliament does not represent a homogenous body and is just
as "federal" as the Council. This is because members of the Parliament, although directly elected, are subject to the different national
election procedures of the Member States. It is therefore not clear
why it is a more appropriate body to determine what is binding for
individuals. 85 However, the planned common European universal
suffrage is, however, likely to diminish such concerns. As to the practical chances of an extension of the Parliament's role with respect to
the application of article 235, one must presently, just as in 1972, rely
on the political goodwill of the Community institutions. Statements
like the one recently made by Commission President Detors186 will
hopefully turn from solemn proclamations into realities. The ongoing
debate on the Political Union is clearly a step in this direction.
181. Vedel Report, supra note 141. See also Frowein, Zur institutionellen Fortentwicklung
der Gemeinschaft, 33 EA 623 (1972).
182. Matters in which the Parliament should have been given power of co-decision included
the revision of the Treaties, the admission of new members and the ratification of international
agreements concluded by the Community.
183. Vedel Report, supra note 141, at 39, 41, 45.
184. Tizzano, supra note 37, at 51.
185. Klein, supra note 129, at 105.
186. "I know that there is a debate on the democratic deficit and I have no doubt whatsoever
that, before too long, the powers of the Strasbourg assembly will be strengthened further." Address by J. Delors, supra note 173.
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FINAL REMARKS

Since 1972, article 235 has increasingly served as the legal basis for
the expansion of Community powers into areas of authority originally
reserved to the Member States. Views supporting an expansive interpretation and application of this provision currently prevail, and practice has shown that anything which was politically feasible could be
justified on the basis of article 235. In several instances, most importantly with respect to the environmental policy of the Community, the
application of article 235 went beyond the limitations imposed on it by
the Treaty. Expansive interpretation went so far as to blur the distinction between article 235 and the amendment provision of article 236.
This broad interpretation of the provision affects national constitutional principles which the Community is bound to respect as general
principles of law, such as democracy, the Rule of Law and the rights
of federal entities within the Member States. The unpredictability inherent in article 235 and its open-ended character affect the basic constitutional rights of the citizens of the Member States to foreseeability
and stability of the law. The practice of using article 235 as a basis for
the creation of new Community powers without the participation of
national legislatures violates the citizen's right to laws enacted according to a democratic procedure. The increase in Community powers
also curtails the powers of federal entities within the Member States.
Yet these constitutional principles are of special importance for a
Europe striving for political union. The concept of democracy has
gained importance in the wake of the impetuous movement for political participation in Eastern Europe, and also because of the increasing
estrangement of the population of Member States from Community
policies. German unification has proven the indispensibility of the
Rule of Law. Through strict adherence to this principle for many decades, the Federal Republic of Germany reinstated its political credibility and its reliability as a peaceful actor on the international stage,
thereby making unification possible. Federal structures and decentralization, for their part, are keystones of the preservation and furtherance of the variety, diversity and individuality of the cultures and
peoples of Europe.
While it is imperative that these principles be considered in every
Community decision, it would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of
the Treaty to systematically narrow the interpretation of article 235 in
order to protect constitutional principles of the Member States. Article 235 must be interpreted as broadly as is necessary to fulfill its function, but at the same time narrowly enough to keep it in harmony with
those principles contained in the legal order of the Community which
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are intended to avoid conflicts between the Member States and the
Community. It has always been one of Europe's main challenges to
preserve the fragile balance of powers between the Community and
Member States, to reconcile integration and sovereignty. The Community has been conceived in a way that makes this balance possible if
the limits imposed by its "constitution," such as the principles of subsidiarity and compitence d'attribution, are respected.
With regard to the preservation of the democratic principle, the
participation of a stronger European Parliament would contribute a
vital participatory element to Community decision-making under article 235. The ongoing institutional reform presents the opportunity to
amend article 235 of the Treaty to include the approval by the Parliament of every measure taken in accordance with the provision.

